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John Bishop Ballem, Q.C.* Energy from Canada's Frontier:
A Fading Dream?
1. Introduction
By the end of the present century, oil and gas from Canada's
frontier should comprise a substantial proportion of our total energy
supply. The economic activity generated by the huge capital
investments required to utilize these resources should have done
much to improve Canada's economy. However, whether these
desirable goals will, in fact, be achieved is still very much an open
question. Ordinarily, the fundamental uncertainty in dealing with
oil and gas concerns whether or not these elusive substances
actually exist in the area being searched. In the case of frontier oil
and gas, however, the real question is not so much whether the
hydrocarbons themselves exist, but whether there is a national will
to harness these resources.
There has been sufficient exploration in the frontier areas such
that it is now possible to predict, with a fair measure of confidence,
that threshhold reserves of either oil or natural gas will be
established in the following areas: the Scotian Shelf, offshore
Newfoundland, the Mackenzie Delta-Beaufort Sea, and the Arctic
Islands. Threshhold reserves are those reserves which will support a
level of daily production great enough to justify the multi-billion
dollar investments that are required in order to bring the reserves to
market. The Scotian Shelf is gas prone, and will require initial daily
volumes of approximately 500 million cubic feet (14.6 x 106m3) to
make development feasible. The existence of reserves of the
magnitude necessary to provide this level of production has already
been established. The Hibernia oil field, off the coast of
Newfoundland, will require minimum daily volumes of 250,000
barrels (39,683 m3) per day, and again, the necessary reserves have
been proved to exist. Sufficient natural gas has been found in the
Arctic Islands to support a proposal to liquify natural gas and move
it to market with icebreaking tankers. If the Arctic Island reserves
were to be combined with those in the Mackenzie Delta - Beaufort
Sea area, the total would be sufficient to justify a gas pipeline
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system. Oil from the Arctic is still problematic. It has been
discovered in both the Arctic Islands and the Beaufort Sea, but to
date the results have fallen well short of the necessary threshhold
volumes.
From a purely physical and technological viewpoint, these
frontier resources are now ready to be tapped. However, the actual
timing of their development will ultimately depend on economic
considerations and on the national objectives mandated by
government. The economic aspects are related directly to the
fundamental economic principle of supply and demand. The supply
is available, but the demand must be present before the source of
supply can be developed.
The demand for frontier oil and gas is a complex matter,
involving such considerations as worldwide supply, pricing
policies, conservation, and the fortunes of OPEC. This demand is
also in a state of constant flux. During the early seventies, it was
popularly supposed that Canada was facing a shortage of natural
gas, and that there was a critical need for frontier sources to meet
the deficiency. As a result, several projects were proposed to bring
Mackenzie Delta gas to market. None of the proposed projects have
materialized, due primarily to the fact that the apprehended shortage
never did occur. In this particular instance, the situation worked out
for the best. However, the experience is a very good illustration of
the short time-span in which energy-related situations can reverse
themselves. It is also a reminder that we should not allow ourselves
to be lulled into a false sense of security as a result of today's energy
glut.
As is often the case, the economic viability of developing our
frontier resources will depend on external factors over which
Canada has no control. If oil remains in a state of oversupply
throughout the world and the price fails to regain its upward
momentum, it simply will not be economic to bring some of the
frontier areas into production. Hibernia, and possibly the Scotian
Shelf project, will probably proceed in any event, since they can
become operational fairly soon and because their economics allow
for some flexibility. However, the more costly arctic projects would
probably fall by the wayside, and would continue only on a pilot
basis in order to refine the necessary technology. On the other hand,
if the world oil situation improves in the next two to three years, as
seems probable, all of these projects could be put into operation.
Nevertheless, important as the economic aspects are, national
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objectives, as perceived by government, will play the decisive role
in determining when the resources of the frontiers will be utilized. It
hardly seems necessary to point out that economic reality and
government-mandated objectives are not always consistent with
each other.
The first thing to be noted about frontier resources is that, without
exception, they are located in areas where the federal government is
the dominant force. In the Mackenzie Delta, the Beaufort Sea, and
the Arctic Islands, the federal government has virtually exclusive
legislative jurisdiction. This jurisdiction may be diluted in the future
as the Yukon and the Northwest Territories achieve greater political
status, but the federal government can still be expected to maintain a
very considerable presence. With respect to the east coast's offshore
resources, the opposition expressed by the provinces has been very
much a factor. The jurisdictional dispute between the province of
Nova Scotia and the federal government has been settled politically,
if not legally, with an agreement between the two governments that
they will share administration. The dispute between the Newfound-
land government and the federal government has, so far, resisted a
political solution, and the legal question is currently before the
courts. The federal government has asked the Supreme Court of
Canada to consider the question by way of a constitutional
reference. A similar reference, made by the Newfoundland
government to the Newfoundland courts, resulted in a unanimous
decision to uphold the federal government's claim to ownership of
the resources that lie seaward of the territorial sea. The
Newfoundland government has appealed this decision to the
Supreme Court of Canada. Regardless of the final outcome, federal
legislation and regulation will continue to play a significant role in
the development of Newfoundland's offshore resources.
In the past few years, the federal government has intervened
extensively in the resource field, and has done so principally
through the National Energy Program. The government's overall
plan involves the following major components:
(a) a substantial degree of direct government ownership and
participation;
(b) the establishment of a system to direct and administer
operations on the frontiers;
(c) energy self-sufficiency;
(d) "Canadianization" of the industry;
(e) increased frontier activity.
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It is difficult to disagree with any of the stated objectives when they
are viewed in isolation. For example, no one can seriously argue
that the foreign ownership of the industry should remain at its 1980
level of seventy-two percent, or that energy self-sufficiency is not
an enviable position to be in when so much of the world's supply is
controlled by capricious and unpredictable host countries. The
trouble is that it is impossible to view each of these objectives in
isolation; they are unavoidably interrelated. Moreover, it simply
may not be possible to achieve all of them simultaneously, and
conditions may dictate that different emphasis be placed on the
various objectives in order to not jeopardize their ultimate
attainment.
For the purposes of this discussion, I have assigned the highest
priority to the objective of developing the frontier resources. There
are grounds for concern that existing legislation and the regulatory
processes in this country may be hindering, rather than helping, this
development. The importance of frontier energy demands that an
examination of the situation be made to see if this concern is
justified.
II. Legislation
The Canada Oil and Gas Act,' which took more than a decade to be
completed, is clearly designed to be a comprehensive code,
covering virtually every aspect of exploration and development on
frontier lands. The act applies to "Canada lands", which are
defined as federal lands in the Yukon Territory, in the Northwest
Territories, on Sable Island, and offshore. The offshore areas
extend to the greater of either the outer edge of the continental
margin or a distance of two hundred nautical miles. The act has
retroactive operation, as, subject to certain transitional provisions, it
affects existing rights.
The act sets up the regime which all operators in the frontier areas
must operate under. However, it is much more extensive than that,
as it is also the instrument under which the federal government's
ownership role is created and it is characterized by an almost
unlimited discretion, conferred upon the officials responsible for its
administration. The discretionary powers of the minister (who is the
Minister of Energy, Mines & Resources or the Minister of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development, depending on which depart-
1. S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 81.
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ment has administrative responsibility for the lands in question)
commence at the earliest stage of development - the initial
disposition of the Canada lands. Under the act, this initial
disposition is carried out by way of an exploration agreement which
grants a non-exclusive right to explore and an exclusive right to
drill, develop, and obtain a production licence. Before entering into
an exploration agreement, the minister will publish a notice calling
for the submission of proposals. In the normal course of events, he
may then select any proposal and may take into account whatever
factors he considers to be appropriate and in the "public interest".
There are no guidelines whereby the industry can ascertain what
factors will be decisive in securing the approval of the minister, that
is, whether proposals will be favored which include large cash
bonuses, long-term work programs, acceptable Canadian ownership
rates, or Petro-Canada as a party, or whether other factors will be
taken into consideration. In addition, the act does not make it clear
whether the call for proposals is similar to the traditional system of
posting lands for public auction, or whether the minister is free to
negotiate an arrangement with one party to an advanced stage, and
then search for more attractive offers.
Although calling for proposals is the standard procedure under
the act, the minister may enter into an exploration agreement
without going through that formality. The only check on his power
to dispose of mineral rights by private arrangement is the
requirement to publish a notice of the exploration agreement, along
with a summary of its terms and conditions. The authority to enter
into exploration agreements without calling for public proposals or
tenders is a marked departure from what has been the norm in
conventional oil and gas development in this country.
The government defends this ability to deal privately, on the
ground that it will expedite frontier development. However, as there
is no way of knowing what other parties might have been prepared
to offer, there can be no assurance that frontier development will, in
fact, be expedited or that it is taking place on the best possible
terms. That the government intends to make use of this wide
discretion was demonstrated by one of the first dispositions of
Canada lands under the act. In July, 1982, the Minister of Energy,
Mines and Resources awarded four exploration agreements which
cover some 4.2 million acres (1.2 million hectares), approximately
30 kilometers north of Sable Island. The exploration agreements
were entered into with Petro-Canada Exploration Inc. (which held a
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50 percent interest), Bow Valley Industries Ltd. (with a 25 percent
interest), and Husky Oil Operations Ltd. (also with a 25 percent
interest), without calling for any other proposals.
When an exploration agreement is in force, the minister has the
power to unilaterally increase and accelerate the financial
obligations of the holder. If he declares that there has been a
"significant discovery", he is then able to order the drilling of
additional wells and is limited only by the fact that no drilling order
can require an interest owner to drill more than three wells at one
time. Since the cost of a single frontier well can amount to hundreds
of millions of dollars, the risk of being faced with such a declaration
could be prohibitive to a potential participant. Under an exploration
agreement, the minister also has the right to declare that there has
been a "commercial discovery", whereupon he can issue further
drilling orders with no limitation on the number of wells, and can
even specify the time and the location of the drilling. With powers
such as these, the government has taken a seat at the corporate
boardroom table, and seems also to fancy itself in the role of
geologist.
Other important areas in which ministerial discretion can be
exercised are:
a) the negotiation of the terms under which an expiring
exploration agreement may be extended;
b) the issuing of orders that Petro-Canada will be the operator of
any interest;
c) the issuing of orders to commence, continue, or increase
production;
d) veto power over any transfer, assignment, or other disposition
of an interest;
e) decisions regarding what portion of the lands held under
existing permits may be retained by the holder.
The act does provide for a limited review of the minister's
exercise of some of his discretionary powers. However, there are
substantial discretionary powers that are not subject to such a review
procedure. Some of the more important exceptions include his
decisions to issue production licences, to issue drilling orders, and
not to call for exploration agreement proposals. Furthermore, even
in those cases where it does exist, the protection offered by the
review procedure is extremely limited. The review process consists
of notice of the proposed order being given prior to the order being
made, a hearing being conducted by the minister, and, if requested,
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reasons being given for the order. Thus, the minister is the sole
judge of his own exercise of discretionary power. This unfortunate
aspect could have been avoided by the designation of some
independent board or tribunal as the reviewing agency, either on an
ad hoc basis, or in a continuing capacity such as that of the
National Energy Board. The act does provide a right to appeal the
result of the minister's review of his own order to the federal Court
of Appeal under section 28 of The Federal Court Act. 2 This appeal
is restricted to cases which involve abuse of the rules of natural
justice, errors in law, or erroneous findings of fact which were made
in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard to the
evidence. The broad discretionary power of the minister would
make it exceedingly difficult to establish any error of law or
violation of natural justice.
The discretionary powers embodied in the act are compounded by
what appear to be deliberate ambiguities and vagueness in the
wording of many important sections. Many terms which one would
normally expect to have been defined are left open. There is, for
example, no definition of "related" or "adjacent" lands, terms
which are relevant to the extent of the lands to be included in any
renegotiation of an exploration agreement and to the determination
of lands subject to drilling obligations which result from the
declaration of a significant or commercial discovery. Lawyers grow
accustomed to coping with ambiguities and vague wording in
statutes, English being the imprecise and flexible language that it is.
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the act has more than its share of
such problems. It may be that some of the uncertainties will be
removed by regulations passed under the wide regulatory powers
conferred on cabinet by the act. On the other hand, the vagueness is
so closely allied to the broad discretionary power of the minister that
it would appear to be a deliberate attempt to leave as much as
possible to future and arbitrary determination. This may be
desirable from the government's point of view, but it seems to
require considerable courage, or blind trust, on the part of oil
companies to proceed in the face of such unknowns.
An exploration agreement does not confer the right to produce on
those involved in the agreement. Production can only occur when a
production licence has been obtained and the holder has succeeded
in satisfying the minister that a commercial discovery has been
2. R.S.C. 1970(2nd Supp.), c. 10.
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made. It is only at this stage that the act concerns itself with the
matter of Canadian ownership. If the holders of a production licence
do not collectively have a Canadian Ownership Rating of at least
fifty percent, the shortfall will revert to the Crown. 3 Although the
act only introduces Canadian ownership considerations at the
production stage, the effect of these considerations may be felt
much earlier. For example, if a multi-national company knows that
it can only obtain a very restricted right to produce, it will not be
inclined to spend the enormous sums required to explore the
potential of the frontiers. While frontier exploration is an
enormously expensive proposition, the development phase which
leads up to production can be ten times as costly. In addition, the
attachment of frontier resources requires multi-billion dollar
facilities, such as liquifaction plants, icebreaking tankers, and arctic
pipelines. The roster of corporations with enough financial clout to
even contemplate such enormous investments is extremely limited.
If the participation of multi-nationals is discouraged, there are very
few Canadian companies that can replace them in financing these
mega-projects.
There are those who believe that the government can and will
replace the multi-nationals as the source of financing. While the
government has given financial support to the exploration stage
through the use of petroleum incentive grants, as will be discussed
later, it has so far shown little interest in financing the actual
development projects. Moreover, there is considerable doubt that
the government could finance the vast sums required, even if it were
inclined to do so. The current annual deficits of thirty billion dollars
will seem almost trifling when compared to the mind-boggling
expenditures necessary to harness frontier energy.
Another major thrust of the act is that it reserves for the federal
Crown a twenty-five percent share in all interests. This crown share
is carved out of the interests held by the various parties, with
virtually no compensation offered. The minister may offer the
crown share by public tender or he may transfer it to a designated
crown corporation, such as Petro-Canada, at any time prior to
authorizing a "system" for producing oil or gas. Until this
authorization, the crown share is a carried interest, and the crown
3. The process by which the Canadian Ownership Rating (COR) is determined
does not form part of the act. It is dealt with under the Canadian Ownership and
Control Determination Act, S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 107 (Part I).
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corporation is allowed to participate and vote in decisions respecting
operations on the lands, even though it bears none of the costs. In
addition, the minister may direct that the corporation shall be the
operator, although it must, upon this direction, convert the carried
interest into a normal working interest.
The reservation of the twenty-five percent share for the Crown
applies not only to newly acquired rights, but also to existing rights.
This confiscatory aspect of the act has had a serious, negative
impact on investor confidence in foreign capital markets. It is, of
course, difficult to quantify the impact that this will have on the
future financing of frontier development, but there is no doubt that it
will be reflected in both the availability and the cost of capital.
Traditionally, the oil industry seems to work best, particularly in
the exploration phase, when a large number of participants is
actively involved in the search. The resultant competition leads to
active and aggressive exploration and to the development of new
exploration techniques. While reserves at or near threshhold levels
have already been established in a number of frontier areas, the
greatest benefit to Canada will occur only when substantial volumes
in excess of the bare economic minimums are discovered and
developed.
An overall assessment of the act seems to indicate that the
government may have made some serious miscaculations with
regard to the timing of several of its measures, and this may have
the untoward effect of eliminating some of the essential players.
The thinning of the ranks will, almost inevitably, be brought about
by the following aspects and effects of the act:
(a) Canadianization of the industry;
(b) the undermining of industry and investor confidence by the
reservation of sweeping discretionary powers;
(c) the reluctance of companies to accept the uncertainties and
risks inherent in the discretionary powers and vagueness of the
act;
(d) the minister's ability to discriminate among potential
participants.
The Petroleum Incentives Program Act 4 will offset some of the
negative aspects of the Canada Oil and Gas Act, while aggravating
others. The incentive program is designed to increase the level of
Canadian participation and to encourage exploration on federal
4. S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 107 (Part 1).
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lands. It seeks to achieve this twofold purpose through a system of
incentive, or PIP, grants, which were intended to be funded by
additional revenue generated by new taxes enacted under the
National Energy Program, and primarily by the tax to be collected
under the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax Act. 5 Except for those
who are philosophically in favor of complete state intervention, the
spectacle of a government gathering revenues from the private
sector and then doling them out again to meet its own objectives
cannot help but be disquieting - and is even more so when one
thinks of how this same approach could be applied in other areas of
economic activity.
The PIP grants are slanted in favor of exploration on federal
lands, since they can then be for as much as eighty percent of the
exploration expenses, while the maximum amount allotted for
exploration on provincial lands is only thirty-five percent. The
Canadianization aspect is achieved by adjusting the level of the
grants according to the applicant's Canadian Ownership Rate. The
grants can range from a minimum of twenty-five percent for an
applicant with a Canadian Ownership Rate of less than fifty percent
to a maximum of eighty percent for those with a rating of
seventy-five percent or higher.
6
The Petroleum Incentives Program will have the positive effect of
making it possible for a number of the smaller Canadian companies
to participate in frontier exploration, and will thus encourage the
Canadianization of frontier exploration. However, the grants are
only available for the exploratory phase of frontier development;
the program does nothing to facilitate the development phase. And,
by discriminating so severely against foreign companies, it
aggravates one of the more negative aspects of the Canada Oil and
Gas Act.
III. The Regulatory Process
Any large oil and gas project brings with it an assortment of
technical, economic, environmental, and socio-economic concerns.
The frontiers, however, involve more numerous and more delicate
environmental concerns, as well as unique social structures. The
5. S.C. 1980-81-81, c. 68 (Part IV).
6. The seventy-five percent requirement will not be fully effective until 1986. The
requirement in 1981 is sixty-five percent, with annual increases until the
seventy-five percent level is reached in 1986.
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harsh physical environment also means that novel technology must
be employed, and the magnitude of the necessary investment will
entail unique financing concepts. All of these factors indicate that
frontier projects must be scrutinized very carefully before
construction is authorized. Yet, while caution is clearly called for, it
should not be exercised to the point of becoming counter-productive
and, in effect, eliminating worthwhile projects that are truly in the
national interest. Frontier projects are highly vulnerable to
over-regulation, since they are at the economic margin and are
critically sensitive to the increased costs and loss of revenue caused
by undue delay.
Today, any applicant seeking approval for a project faces a
daunting array of regulatory hurdles. The regulatory structure that is
presently in place appears to have grown haphazardly and
exponentially. It comes in many guises, including the traditional
quasi-judicial tribunals, such as the National Energy Board (NEB);
specially appointed commissions, the most famous of which is the
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, which was conducted by Mr.
Justice Berger; and the increasing number of review and approval
processes that are being developed within the bureaucracy, such as
the Canadian Oil and Gas Lands Administration (COGLA). The
NEB is unquestionably the most conspicuous and important of these
review agencies. It has original jurisdiction over three major
elements that are essential to the success of any frontier
development. First, the export of oil or gas from Canada cannot
occur without a licence from the NEB. It is almost certain that the
frontier projects will require a substantial export component, at least
initially, in order to be economically viable. Second, the NEB has
complete jurisdiction over the construction of the necessary
facilities, such as pipelines to transport the resource. Finally, and
almost as important, it has complete jurisdiction over the tolls to be
collected by the project. In the past, tolls were not fixed until after a
project was in operation, but the huge investments involved in the
frontiers require the chosen form of tariff to be in place before a
project can be financed. In addition to the three areas of original
jurisdiction, the minister may request the NEB to inquire into and
advise him on any energy matter, and the cabinet may direct the
board to assume supervision and control over the movement of oil
and gas out of the producing province or an offshore area.
The most obvious form of over-regulation today lies in the
duplication of the approval process. For example, a new project
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must face a detailed review of all its aspects by the NEB, a review
of the environmental and social aspects by an ad hoc panel which is
established by the government, a possible review by a specially
appointed commission of inquiry, and a variety of specialized
reviews by one or more government departments and agencies. A
multi-layered structure such as this makes it impossible to avoid
costly and unnecessary duplication. Undoubtedly, the most glaring
example of duplication occurred in connection with the proposed
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline. The Inquiry Commissioner presided
over some twenty months of hearings on the environmental and
socio-economic impact of the competing projects, while the NEB
was simultaneously reviewing the selfsame aspects of those projects.
The result was that an unfair and unjustified burden was placed on
the applicants to prove their cases not once, but twice.
Duplication continues to be a problem, as was evidenced by the
Norman Wells Pipeline application in 1980. An Environmental
Assessment Review Process (EARP) has been established by the
Government Organization Act, 1979,1 and is intended to assess at
an early stage any adverse environmental effects of projects on
federal lands, and to hold further reviews of those activities that are
found to have probable and significant adverse effects. Insofar as an
assessment is made at an early stage in the development of a project
and it is done when there are no other applicable reviews, the
process is undoubtedly beneficial. If, however, as happened in the
Norman Wells case, the process takes place contemporaneously
with the NEB hearings, the result is a totally unjustified duplication.
The worst aspect of regulatory duplication is that it is
unnecessary; the best is that it should be easy to eliminate. The
problem of duplication can be remedied in one of two ways: by the
"one-window" approach, whereby one tribunal is given sole
responsibility for evaluating an application, or by compartmen-
talizing the jurisdiction among a number of tribunals in such a way
as to ensure that there is no jurisdictional overlap. The second
approach is not recommended, as it would appear to be difficult to
implement in practice because frontier projects do not lend
themselves to piecemeal examination. However, the first alternative
- the one-window approach - seems to be a workable and readily
attainable solution. In large measure, it has already been successful
in Alberta, where the Energy Resources Conservation Board
7. S.C., 1978-79, c. 13, s. 15.
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(ERCB) functions as the public review agency for provincial energy
projects. The one-window approach is enhanced by the attitude of
the Alberta government, which normally relies on the findings of
the ERCB, rather than requiring additional bureaucratic reviews.
COGLA is frequently cited as a federal example of the one-window
approach, and since it is designed to combine the concerns of two
federal departments, it is clearly a step in the right direction.
Nonetheless, there still remains a multiplicity of other federal
agencies and tribunals which must be dealt with by any applicant.
If a one-window approach were to be instituted, the obvious
vehicle would appear to be the NEB. It has been in existence since
1959, and has accumulated a body of experience and expertise in
areas that are relevant to frontier projects. The selection of the NEB
as the one-window agency would also ensure that applications were
dealt with by a quasi-judicial, rather than a purely administrative,
body. A quasi-judicial tribunal has, at least in theory, an element of
independence, and its procedures are subject to the full array of the
rules of natural justice.
Apart from duplication, the application process itself is another
element of the regulatory process that is in serious need of revision.
At present, detailed requirements must be met before the applicant
walks through the hearing room door, and the applicant must
undertake numerous studies, containing minutely detailed informa-
tion, in order to meet these requirements. Applications are no longer
measured by the number of pages they contain, but by the number
of meters of shelf space they occupy. These requirements not only
place what may, in some instances, be a prohibitive burden on an
applicant, but are frequently of limited value in assessing an
application. In many cases, there are so many variables that it is
literally impossible to determine the exact form the projects will
ultimately take, a degree of uncertainty which makes many of the
studies almost completely hypothetical. Furthermore, the lengthy
lead time required to bring the projects to completion increases the
number of variables that have to be taken into consideration. In the
result, many of the intensive studies which an applicant is required
to provide at an early stage turn out to be of very limited assistance.
Better quality information could be obtained and some applicants
might come forward if a step-wise approval procedure were to be
instituted. An applicant should be able to find out at an early stage
whether or not his proposal is acceptable in principle, and this "go
or no go" decision could be arrived at without involving the mass of
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supporting detail that is presently required. At this initial stage, the
tribunal could also deal with issues of broad public interest and
matters of principle, with detailed studies to follow at a second
stage. The first stage could result in outright rejection on public
policy grounds, approval with a lengthy list of conditions to be
satisfied, or the information that there were no fundamental
deficiencies in the application, which would remove at least some of
the risk of proceeding with a full-scale application.
Undoubtedly, there will be those who would criticize this
step-wise approach on the ground that it may give unfair momentum
to a project. While this may be a valid cause for concern, it is, on
balance, an acceptable risk that is preferable to the present situation,
which seems designed to inhibit frontier development.
Additional reforms could also improve the hearing process itself
and expedite the procedure, without jeopardizing the rights of the
participants. There could, for example, be much more extensive use
of prehearing conferences to collect facts and isolate the issues that
are truly contentious. The same objective would be served by an
increased use of information requests, on the part of both the
tribunal and the participants, in order to obtain data and information
which does not need to be tested by cross-examination or which is
necessary for the preparation of effective cross-examination.
Discovery procedures could also be used to get factual information
on the record without taking up valuable hearing time. These
information gathering recommendations could be implemented by
the respective tribunals, under their own rules of practice.
IV. Conclusion
The combined effect of the legislation embodied in the Canada Oil
and Gas Act and the existing regulatory structure is clearly
working against the realization of the resource potential of our
frontiers. No doubt many would argue that this is an acceptable
price to pay for the attainment of some of the other government-
mandated national objectives described earlier. The frontiers,
however, represent our best, and perhaps only, hope of achieving
energy self-sufficiency. In view of the fact that the major producing
countries in the western world include such volatile and
unpredictable states as Iran, Libya, and Nigeria, and that even
currently reliable sources, such as Saudi Arabia, are susceptible to
"de-stabilization", it seems obvious that Canada should pursue the
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attachment of frontier energy as one of its most pressing national
goals. It would be a tragic mistake to leave unnecessary obstacles in
place when they can be removed without sacrificing the
effectiveness of the regulatory review process or the ultimate
attainment of other desirable social goals. If these obstacles are not
removed or moderated, the effect may be to eliminate some of the
larger projects, or, at the very least, to delay them until the next
century.
